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In Mind and World (1994/1996), John McDowell 
follows Donald Davidson in claiming that the world is a 
conceptually laden structure. A (conceptual) language and 
tradition constitutes the world, and our (conceptual) 
“openness to the world” (ibid, p.155). This means that the 
condition for access to the world is a clear subject – object 
split, and a clear split between content and the way the 
content is presented. With this view as the basis he 
criticizes the idea of a non-conceptual1 experience and 
non-conceptual content, starting from the demand that 
(conceptual) thinking must be constrained by, and 
rationally answerable to the empirical world (ibid p.xii).  
If conceptual structures are understood as 
separable from a non-conceptual experience, we stand in 
front of a dilemma according to McDowell: Either we have 
to deny experience the role of providing rational reasons 
(as long as rational reasons requires conceptual reasons 
that a subject can give for holding for example a belief [ibid 
p. 165]). Or, we embrace the Myth of the Given, i.e. a 
separation between scheme and content and in 
McDowell’s understanding an acceptance of conceptual 
structures that reaches outside of the conceptual realm in 
an inconsistent model of experience and conceptual 
structures. Common to both of those horns is not only the 
dualistic separation between experience and conceptual 
structures (ibid p. xi-xxiv and pp 3), but also the 
metaphysical idea of a clear separation between the non-
conceptual (be it experience, surface irritations, stimulus, 
natural processes or whatever) and the conceptual. 
McDowell’s way out of the dilemma is to question the first 
dualism. Experience is understood as conceptually 
structured, and inseparable from the conceptual realm. 
This provides for giving experience a rational role. 
McDowell emphasises that conceptual capacities are 
drawn on in experience, they are not exercised on an 
independent experience. (ibid, p. 10). A subject that is 
moving from experience to judgement in, for example 
Gareth Evans’ model where experience and the 
conceptual system are kept apart is moving between 
separable spheres – from a non-conceptual, animal sphere 
to a conceptual, human sphere. In McDowell’s system the 
movement into the conceptual, from animal to human, 
takes place differently and on a developmental line2.  It is a 
movement over time where a “mere animal” with a (non-
conceptual) “sensitivity” to her environment achieves a 
conceptually structured experience when entering Bildung. 
This also involves a transformation of the animal 
environment to a human world and of a “proto-subjectivity” 
(ibid p.117) into a “full-fledged subjectivity” (ibid), and it 
“brings intentional bodily action on to the scene” (ibid 
p.117).  
Another way to avoid those horns is to reverse 
McDowell’s model of experience and conceptual system. 
Such an alternative would take aconceptual experience 
that is not yet conceptually structured as its starting point3, 
as opposed to McDowell’s model where conceptual 
                                                     
1 The term aconceptuality, previously used here, refers to phenomena where 
the distinction between non-conceptuality and conceptuality can not be 
applied.  
2 Evan’s philosophy contains a developmental movement too, in the sense that 
non-conceptual perception should only count as experience if it is available as 
“input to thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system” (Evans 1982, p. 
158). 
3 See Pauli Pylkkö, 1998 and Tere Vadén, 2001. 
structures such as subject and object are conditions for 
experience. Here conceptual structures are instead 
understood to grow continuously in experience and the 
autonomy of the conceptual realm is questioned. This 
means that the conceptual realm does not belong into 
another realm than experience but conceptual structures 
arise within experience. Thinking, believing and judging 
are also to be seen as types of experiences. In 
aconceptual experience world and mind are not separated 
but must be seen as a whole. The world is not an external 
object, but an experiential and meaningful environment in 
which world and mind cannot be ideally separated. In this 
picture we can talk about experience serving a rationally 
justifying role in an approximate sense at best. If a fully 
conceptually structured experience (that satisfy demands 
on conceptuality such as Evan’s Generality Constraint 
[Evans, 1982], objectuality, objectivity and systematicity) 
can only be seen as an ideal, that can be approximated in 
real human agency and practice growing from “proto-
subjectivity”, this consequence need not be radically 
different from the consequences of McDowell’s way of 
picturing experience4. 
A problem in McDowell’s philosophy is a dualism 
within nature that renders the entrance into the conceptual 
realm mystical. Nature as natural sciences describe it is in 
McDowell’s philosophy understood as “the realm of law” 
whose inhabitants are characterized by “a lack of freedom” 
(ibid p. 117), while intentionality, freedom and agency are 
understood as belonging to “the logical space of reasons”, 
that is, to the conceptual system and capacities that a 
human being gets access to as she grows from a ‘mere 
animal’ to subject and agent. Since “world” in McDowell’s 
understanding is equated with a conceptually structured 
world, consisting of ‘inner’ and ‘outer objects’ (ibid p. 30-
33), intentionality is a purely conceptual affair: a non-
conceptual content is no content at all since it is not 
objective and does not present objects in an independent 
and detached reality whose existence presupposes a clear 
subject – object split. In experience and thought we are 
‘open to the world’ only as long as the content of 
experience and thinking is conceptual (ibid p. 31, 37, 47, 
54). A non-conceptual experience or ‘intuitions without 
concepts’ can provide no ‘glimpses of the world’, at least 
not as long as the world is understood to have a 
conceptual structure; it is ‘blind’ (ibid p. 32, 89). For 
avoiding that the transformation from “the realm of law” to 
“the space of reasons” takes place outside of nature, but 
still be able to keep the separation between the “realm of 
law” and “the space of reasons” clear to provide for 
freedom in “the space of reasons”, McDowell introduces 
the idea of a “second nature”. Children are ‘born mere 
animals’ and as they enter their first language and Bildung, 
they move from a ‘first nature’ (‘the realm of law’) into a 
second nature, (“the space of reasons”) (ibid p. 125). The 
movement is a movement from a “mere” animal’s being in 
an environment where conceptual structures such as 
subjects and objects have not arisen (ibid p. 117), into a 
“full-fledged” subject and agent in a conceptually 
structured world. Even if we respect McDowell’s 
                                                     
4 Another consequence of McDowell’s demands on experience is that old 
people, children, animals, artificial networks and people from cultures that do 
not have a conceptually structured language cannot be seen as experiencing 
since their “sensitivity” is not conceptually structured. 
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understanding of “world” this discontinuity in nature is 
problematic, and non-conceptual content and a more 
primitive intentionality seems to be needed to make the 
development into the human ‘glimpse of the world’ 
possible.5  
McDowell’s rethinking of naturalism is a refusal to 
equate nature with a “disenchanted” nature (i.e. a picture 
of nature that excludes meaning), or to put it differently: a 
refusal to equate it with the abstraction that was used to 
characterise nature in the Newtonian paradigm. But this 
rethinking must start on a more fundamental level and 
demands a rethinking not only of nature but also of 
meaning, a rethinking which needs to provide for a 
continuous and non-dualistic conception of nature. 
Meaning, agency and intentionality go deeper down in 
nature than human beings and “full-fledged subjects”.  
A radical way of defending non-conceptual content 
is to question McDowell’s understanding of “world” as well 
as “mind”, and therefore also of nature. Thinkers like 
Heidegger (1992, p. 63-110), Merleau-Ponty (1968, p.248-
249; 1962/1986, p. 71) and Pauli Pylkkö (1998) are 
emphasising that the world is to be understood as a 
holistic cultural and natural experiential environment, 
where mind and world are not separated. In McDowell’s 
understanding the possibility of a subject (mind)/ object 
(world) split is a condition for worlds and meaning. Here, 
conceptual structures are instead understood to arise 
gradually within nature and they presuppose a lower level 
of content. Conceptual structures are not in McDowell’s 
sense transcendental with respect to their aconceptual 
origin. Pylkkö emphasizes that conceptual structures, and 
conceptually structured experience, action and language 
grow from, and are to be explained in terms of what 
McDowell calls “proto-subjectivity” and an “animal 
environment”. Fully conceptual structures can at best be 
approximated. (Pylkkö, 1998). Also according to Adrian 
Cussins experience is to be understood in this way as 
fundamentally embodied and non-conceptual. Conceptual 
structures presupposes a human practice and action 
whose content is too holistic or inseparable6 to satisfy for 
example Evan’s Generality Constraint for concepts. 
Cussins describes experience as structured in a non-pure 
continuum: 
My claim is that we are – as adult humans – still 
awash in a partially differentiated, partially objective, 
mind/world continuum, at which pain-experiences lie at the 
one end, various sorts of emotional experience a little 
further in, then colour-experience, then, perhaps, shape-
experience, and the experience of democratic justice. 
(Cussins, 1990, s. 411.) 
Discussions within recent physics seem to support 
the idea of the world as a holistic and non-separable 
wholeness that cannot be fully conceptually analysable. 
Thinkers like Niels Bohr and David Bohm who are usually 
thought to be radically different both emphasise the limits 
of conceptual analysability of quantum phenomena. While 
Bohr points to epistemological problems in the description 
of empirical phenomena, the later Bohm’s ontological 
interpretation puts limits to the idea of both world and mind 
understood as conceptually structured. Bohm understands 
the basic reality as an undivided wholeness where 
distinctions such as subject – subject (and therefore 
subject – object) cannot, strictly speaking, be upheld (See 
                                                     
5 See for example Ron Chrisley, 1996, p. 66; Adrian Cussins, 1990 and 1992;  
Daniel D. Hutto (1998 and 1999, p.122); Jose Luis Bermúdez, 1994 and 1998, 
p. 19 and p. 182; who argue that a more primitive notion of content is needed 
to make sense of the movement from what McDowell calls a “proto-subject” 
into a mature subject.  
6 In the sense of inseparability used by Howard, 1989, which says that the 
behaviour of an inseparable phenomena can not be explained 
comprehensively in terms of any subsystems. 
Bohm, p. 55, 172-179, 210). Subject and object can be 
understood as relatively autonomous subwholes, which 
can be correctly distinguished only in an approximate 
sense. 
The world understood as environment does not 
mean that it is ineffable and beyond articulation – it is not 
fully conceptually articulable, but there are a- and non-
conceptual aspects also in language. For Bohm, the world 
has an explicate aspect and so does mind/experience, and 
thus conceptual description can be possible and 
approximately correct. But an important aspect of the 
understanding of the world as fundamentally holistic and 
inseparable is that it seems as if we risk losing information 
about the world if it is being described as a conceptual 
structure – i.e., conceptual structures, and conceptually 
structured agents are in a sense partially blind to the world. 
Conceptual content presents the world as an independent 
world consisting of conceptually organized separable 
objects and properties, but on the quantum level it is open 
to interpretation whether the world can be understood in 
this sense. 
If conceptual structures can reach no ideal 
transcendent polarisation, the idea of persons, understood 
as ‘full-fledged subjects’ that remains identical over time, 
or full-fledged bodily objects that likewise satisfy 
philosophical criteria of identity, are to be understood as an 
instrumental description. At the fundamental level persons 
are not separated from the immediate environment (that 
can indeed be another person) in a sense that makes 
identity possible. This picture of nature is not incompatible 
with intuitive, pre-theoretical ideas about human 
personality; it is rather the other way around. Within the 
Newtonian paradigm it is indeed hard to see how 
naturalism can possibly be compatible with for example 
meaning and freedom. In the natural science of today, 
however, there seems to be room for freedom and 
meaning without the introduction of a “second nature”, and 
it is not clear that the nature described is “disenchanted”. 
Here freedom, and uniqueness in persons, can be related 
to non-determinism, unrepeatability and unpredictability, 
for example in quantum processes and dynamical 
systems, rather than to rational prediction and control. The 
past cannot fully determine the future, but is open-ended in 
a sense that provides for freedom.7 Free activity 
understood in this way, as well as aconceptual 
intentionality and agency go deeper down in nature than 
the human subject. 
 
 
                                                     
7 See Pylkkö, 1998, p. 104-107and Vadén, 2001, for the idea of freedom 
developed in terms of unpredictability. 
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